Thursday, August 21, 2008

(lengthy lit stuff - a well-elaborated explanation of the dichotomy between Apollonian and Dionysian. Saw delle use it in her 'model' lit essay on MITC. Figured this might be useful. Got this off a review of Webster's plays from jstor, which can be assessed through nlb online acc.)


The Apollonian is that in us that feels a need for
clarity and design and that recognizes the value,
and indeed necessity, of restraint and self-control,
while the Dionysian is that in us that holds selfexpression,
freedom, and the right to live as we
wish as the highest values and finds in mystery,
in the undefined and formless, hints of truths infinitely
more profound than any accessible to
reason. The Apollonian in us acknowledges the
high priority of social concerns and responsibilities,
recognizes the need for law and the necessity
for all kinds of limitations if men are to live together
on this planet; the Dionysian impulse
rebels against the restrictions of law and puts the
assertion of the individual will above docility to social demands. It is the Apollonian instinct that
is the foundation of all morality; and while the
Dionysian impulse is essentially amoral, from the
Apollonian perspective it looks like immorality.
The Apollonian is the party of duty and conscience,
of institutions and traditions, and all that
gives order to human life; and it is the Dionysian
in us that despises duty, finds traditions stultifying,
embraces disorder, and as soon as institutions and
laws are established begins to search out ways to
evade or undermine or defy them. By Apollonian
values the Dionysian is rebel, criminal, anarchic,
hedonistic, and by Dionysian the Apollonian is
sterile, petrified, mechanistic, inhuman. And to
each the other appears profoundly immoral.
Nietzsche, who wanted to think of himself as
primarily Diunysian, tried to assign relative moral
values to the two impulses; but the attempt was
necessarily partisan and inadequate. The fact of
the matter is that every son of Adam and daughter
of Eve from the beginning of time has, in varying
balance, been composed of a mixture of both impulses.
The works of one impulse or the other are
"good" or "bad," depending on the perspective
from which one is operating at the moment. This
is the most elemental contradiction and paradox
of human nature-and it can be seen, depending
on where one is located, as comic or tragic.
If the dichotomy and contradiction of Apollonian
and Dionysian is as basic as has been suggested,
it would appear to provide the stuff, par
excellence, of which drama is made. In point of
fact, I suspect that an awareness of this particular
level of conflict does enter into our responses to
many plays; but I think it should be made articulate
in dramatic criticism.

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